Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation, Gouverneursratssitzung März 2009

Statement by Ambassador Rüdiger Lüdeking on Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Supply Mechanisms

5 March 2009

I would first of all like to associate myself with the statement made by the Czech Republic on behalf of the European Union on the subject of Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Supply Mechanisms. The subject of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle is of particular importance to my delegation. We commend the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. ElBaradei, for his leadership in advocating the establishment of multinational mechanisms to assure access for all countries to nuclear fuel. In September 2004 he established an international expert group whose report circulated in February 2005 set the stage for serious consideration of the issue and prompted several specific proposals put forward by IAEA member states.

My delegation would also like to express its gratitude for the explanations given today by the Russian Federation on its initiative to establish a reserve of low enriched uranium for the supply to the IAEA for its member states.

This proposal a well as the proposal for an IAEA LEU bank put forward by the Nuclear Threat Initiative is aimed at establishing fuel reserves to be used to assure a guaranteed supply if needed. By way of contrast our proposal for a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP), first submitted in 2006, is aimed at providing for the establishment of a multilateral enrichment plant in a territory administered by the IAEA. Taken together with the other two proposals that I mentioned it can – using the description used in the Russian information document on its proposal contained in GOV/INF/2009/1 - be considered as providing for a “menu of options”. The three proposals are in my view complementary elements of a comprehensive multilateral nuclear framework of fuel cycle arrangements.

On Monday, 2 March 2009, on the margins of this Board Meeting, we organized a side event on our MESP proposal. We used it to brief on the state of development of our proposal. In particular we provided details on and made available the draft model host state agreement and the model agreement between a group of interested states and the IAEA. The basic contents of these two model agreements is also outlined in INFCIRC document 735 which was circulated in September last year. This side event provided a forum for a detailed discussion on the opportunities that our proposal offers for states interested in acquiring and owning a commercially run enrichment plant independent from existing enrichment companies. I also believe that the event testified to the maturity of our suggested approach.

Following our side event I was approached and asked what would be in it for Germany. The question was prompted by our clarification that we were not seeking to have a stake in a possible Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project to be established by a group of interested states. I believe that this question is indicative of the continuing scepticism regarding the issue of multilateral fuel supply arrangements. And I believe some of the statements already made today testify to this. There are no narrowly defined selfish motives which have prompted our proposal. Our point of departure is clearly that in order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime it is necessary to address proliferation risks associated with the nuclear fuel cycle. In doing so we need to take account of the interest of all states in an assured, predictable and cost effective supply of nuclear fuel. And we should remain within the existing international legal framework; a requirement that was stressed again today by Argentina on behalf of the G77.

These considerations have been guiding us in the development of our proposal. Our proposal is in full compliance with the three basic principles that the Director General set out in his introductory statement on Monday. It is consistent with Article IV of the NPT. And it is geared towards avoiding the creation of new dividing lines among NPT states parties. Our proposal, which I believe, is also attractive from an economic point of view, provides for an equitable and market compatible solution. It is focussed on creating confidence that on the one hand there is a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel without any curtailment of existing rights and that on the other hand the risk of possible misuse of civilian nuclear programmes is effectively minimized. This should be in the interest of all IAEA member states. Proliferation risks represent a key security concern and a challenge for all of us. To address them effectively we need to join forces and work together.

I am looking forward to the further discussion of our proposal. I would also like at this juncture to thank the Secretariat for the assistance and advice it has provided us with in the elaboration of our proposal.